In a moneyless market, a non disposable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked. The links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another.
Introduction
Balancing demand and supply cannot always be achieved by prices and cash transfers. Rationing is the normal allocation method for emergency aid supplies, assigning patients to hospitals, students to schools, workload among coworkers, etc.. In Sprumont's original rationing model [24] , a given amount of a single non disposable commodity is allocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. An allocation is efficient if and only if individual shares are all on the same side of individual peaks (all consume less, or all consume more, than they wish). The striking result is that the most egalitarian profile of shares, in the sense of Lorenz dominance ( [8] ), defines a revelation mechanism uniquely fair and incentive compatible, in the strong sense of strategyproofness (truthtelling is a dominant strategy). This profile is known as the uniform rationing solution.
A natural two-sided version of Sprumont's model has agents initially endowed with some commodity, so that someone endowed with less (resp. more) than her peak is a potential demander (resp. supplier), and the simultaneous presence of demanders and suppliers creates an opportunity to trade. The corresponding solution gives their peak consumption to agents on the short side of the market, while those on the long side are uniformly rationed (see [11] , [2] ). We generalize that model to a considerable extent, by assuming that the commodity can only be transferred between certain pairs of agents. Such constraints are typically logistical (which supplier can reach which demander in an emergency situation [19] , which worker can handle which job request), but could be subjective as well (as when a hospital chooses to refuse a new patient by declaring "red status" [17] 1 ). Our model allows an arbitrary pattern of feasibility for transfers between suppliers and demanders, represented by a bipartite graph. This complicates the analysis of efficient (Pareto optimal) allocations, because short demand and short supply typically coexist in the same market (see a numerical example in Section 2). We use network flow techniques [1] to show that in the relevant subset of efficient allocations, the market splits in two segments across which no trade occurs, one segment where demanders are rationed while the corresponding suppliers unload their ideal (peak) transfer, and another segment where demanders receive their ideal transfer while suppliers are rationed.
We identify a unique egalitarian efficient allocation, and show that the corresponding revelation mechanism possesses unique fairness and incentivecompatibility properties (on which more below). Our egalitarian allocation admits a compact definition as the Lorenz dominant element within the set of efficient allocations where all agents are weakly rationed (they get at most their ideal trade)
2 . This definition relies on the intimate connection between the solution we propose and the egalitarian solution, introduced by Dutta and Ray [9] , of a supermodular cooperative game. Supermodularity implies that the core of the game has a Lorenz dominant element, which Dutta and Ray call the egalitarian solution of the game. We show that the set of Pareto efficient allocations where all agents are weakly rationed, can be expressed as the intersection of the cores of two supermodular games. Hence this set has a Lorenz dominant element, which is precisely the egalitarian allocation (Theorem 1 in Section 6).
We propose a centralized organization of the market -a clearinghousethat prescribes an allocation efficient with respect to (reported) preferences and (reported) feasible links between agents 3 . We insist on two strong incentivecompatibility properties: strategyproof report of individual preferences; and link monotonicity, stating that an agent can never benefit by "closing" unilaterally one of his feasible links to the other side of the market. For fairness, we require constrained equal-treatment of equals, i.e. our rule must treat two agents with identical preferences on trades (hence on the same side of the market) as equally as possible, given the bilateral feasibility constraints: We cannot make their two transfers more equal without altering the transfer to or from some other agent. Our main result (Theorem 2 in Section 8) is that these three requirements characterize our egalitarian solution.
We already mentioned that our model generalizes that in Klaus et al. [11] , where transfers are possible between every supplier-demander pair. These authors use some different properties to single out uniform rationing of the long side. Back to arbitrary bilateral constraints, if the peaks are identically 1 on both sides, we are in the setting of the (random) matching model with dichotomous preferences, studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] , where now the flow between a supplier-demander pair is thought of as the probability that this pair is matched. That paper focuses as well on the egalitarian solution and the incentives to truthful revelation of feasible links by individuals (as we do) or by coalitions of agents.
Our analysis is also related to the design of exchange mechanisms in networks, for which Kranton and Minehart [12] propose an ascending price mechanism that is strategy-proof and efficient. See also [7] for a bargaining model between agents on a network. A common feature with our work is the decomposition of a graph into several submarkets which simultaneously clear, and where a different price prevails in each submarket. In our model, however, monetary transfers are not allowed so the market does not clear.
Finally our paper [4] considers the related model where the peak supplies are treated as hard constraints, not as agents. This is a direct generalization of Sprumont's model. We characterize there a rule similar to our egalitarian transfer rule by means of efficiency, strategy-proofness and a constrained version of equal treatment of equals. While there are similarities between the two models there are some important differences as well: for example, the egalitarian solution is not link monotonic in that setting.
In the next section we present two motivating examples. We introduce the model in Section 3 and the maximal flow formulation in Section 4. In Section 5 t we characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations. The egalitarian mechanism is defined in Section 6, and its properties analyzed in Section 7. Section 8 states our characterization result, and Section 9 some concluding comments.
Two simple examples
Example 1: Short supply and short demand coexist Short supply and short demand typically coexist in two independent segments of the market. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . Supplier 1 can only transfer to demander 1, whose demand is short against 1's long supply. The two demanders 2, 3 are similarly captive of suppliers 2, 3, 4, whose supply is short against their long demand. Note that decentralized trade may fall short of efficiency. Indeed demander 1 and supplier 2 achieve their ideal consumption by a bilateral transfer of 6 units. However after this transfer supplier 1 is unable to trade, and demanders 2, 3 have to share a short supply of 12 against their long demand of 36. It is more efficient to transfer 6 units from supplier 1 to demander 1 and let suppliers 2, 3, 4 send their 18 units to demanders 2, 3. The first market segment contains the long supplier 1 and the short demander 1. On the other hand, demanders 2,3 compete for transfers from suppliers 2,3,4. These agents form the short supply/long demand segment. Our egalitarian solution rations the long side of the market in each of the two segments. Consider the efficient profile of net transfers (x, y) = ( (6, 6, 4, 8) , (6, 8, 10) ) (x for suppliers, y for demanders). Here demanders 2,3 split equally the transfer from supplier 3 -their only common link. However the profile ( (6, 6, 4, 8) , (6, 9, 9) ) is feasible and Lorenz dominates (x, y), it is our egalitarian solution.
Another implication of the bilateral constraints is that agents with identical Example 2: Identical preferences, different transfers This is illustrated in Figure 2 . There is a single market segment with a long demand, so the suppliers unload their peak transfer. The bilateral constraints, restrict the (non negative) transfers y i to the four demanders as follows:
10 ≤ y 1 ≤ 12; 6 ≤ y 2 ≤ 12; y 3 ≤ 7
Absent the bilateral constraints, we can achieve y i = 7, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Under these constraints, the most egalitarian profile is y 1 = 10, y 2 = 8, y 3 = y 4 = 5.
Transfers with bilateral constraints
We have a set S of suppliers with generic element i, and a set D of demanders with generic element j. A set of transfers of the single commodity from suppliers to demanders results in a vector (x, y) ∈ R
The commodity can only be transferred between certain pairs of supplier i, demander j. The bipartite graph G, a subset of S × D, represents these constraints: ij ∈ G means that a transfer is possible between i ∈ S and j ∈ D. We assume throughout that the graph G is connected, else we can treat each connected component of G as a separate problem.
We use the following notation. For any subsets T ⊆ S, C ⊆ D the restriction of G is G(T, C) = G∩{T ×C} (not necessarily connected). The set of demanders compatible with the suppliers in T is f (T ) = {j ∈ D|G(T, {j}) = ∅}. The set of suppliers compatible with the demanders in C is g(C) = {i ∈ S|G({i}, C) = ∅}. For any subsets T ⊆ S, C ⊆ D, x T := i∈T x i and y C := j∈C y j .
A transfer of goods from S to D is realized by a G-flow ϕ, i.e., a vector ϕ ∈ R G + . We write x(ϕ), y(ϕ) for the transfers implemented by ϕ, namely:
We say that the net transfers (x, y) are feasible if they are implemented by some G-flow. We write Φ(G) for the set of feasible flows, and A(G) for the set of feasible net transfers. We define similarly A(G(S , D )) for any S ⊆ S, D ⊆ D. These sets are described as follows.
Lemma 1: For any S ⊆ S, D ⊆ D the three following statements are equivalent:
and y D = x S Proof: This is a standard application of the Marriage Lemma, see, e.g., [1] .
Maximal flow under capacity constraints
Assume, in this section only, that each supplier i ∈ S has a (hard) capacity constraint s i , i.e., cannot send more than s i units of the commodity. Similarly each demander j ∈ D cannot receive more than d j units.
We write Φ(G, s, d) for the set of feasible flows ϕ such that x(ϕ) ≤ s, and y(ϕ) ≤ d, and A(G, s, d) for the corresponding set of feasible constrained transfers.
The problem of finding the maximal feasible flows between suppliers and demanders thus constrained, is well understood. We can apply the celebrated max-flow/min-cut theorem to the oriented capacity graph Γ(G, s, d) obtained from G by adding a source σ connected to all suppliers, and a sink τ connected to all demanders; by orienting the edges from source to sink; by setting the capacity of an edge in G to infinity, that of an edge σi, i ∈ S, to s i , and that of jτ, τ ∈ D, to d j . A σ-τ cut (or simply a cut) in this graph is a subset X of nodes that contains σ but not τ . The capacity of a cut X is the total capacity of the edges that are oriented from a node in X to a node outside of X (such edges are said to be "in the cut").
We illustrate next this construction.
Example 3:
Canonical flow representation Figure 3 shows the canonical flow representation of Example 1, Figure 1 . The maximum flow from σ to τ is bounded by the capacity of any σ-τ cut, in particular the minimum capacity σ-τ cut. The max-flow/min-cut theorem says that the maximum σ-τ flow has value equal to the capacity of the minimum σ-τ cut. In Figure 3 , the minimum capacity cut contains supplier 1 and demander 1 only (and σ) and has capacity of 24. This is the maximum flow. Note that in the subset of efficient allocations where the long side gets always rationed, any allocation will involve a net transfer of 24. This implies that supplier 1 will unload only 6 units on demander 1: Agents in the minimum cut are in the market segment with long supply; agents outside the minimum cut belong to the segment with long demand.
These observations are summarized as follows: if we fix a maximum flow from σ to τ and a minimum-capacity σ-τ cut, then every edge in the cut must carry a flow equal to its capacity; moreover every edge that is oriented from a node outside of the cut to a node in the cut should carry zero flow. This leads to a key decomposition result. 
ii) The maximal flow is s S+ + d D+ . The flow ϕ ∈ Φ(G, s, d), with net transfers x, y is maximal if and only if
iii) The profile of transfers (x, y) ∈ A(G, s, d) is achieved by a maximal flow if and only if Proof. We apply the max-flow/min-cut to Γ(G, s, d). The max-flow from σ to τ is clearly finite, and so must be the capacity of a minimum σ-τ cut. Fix a min-cut, and let X and Y be the set of suppliers and demanders respectively in that min-cut. Then we claim that Y = f (X). If there exists demander j ∈ Y such that j / ∈ f (X), then the cut's capacity can be reduced by deleting the demander j; if, however, there exists demander j / ∈ Y such that j ∈ f (X), then the cut has infinite capacity.
Set
Moreover, in any maximum-flow, the edges oriented from S + to D + are backward edges in the cut, so they must carry zero flow. The edges from σ to S + and the edges from D + to τ are the edges in the cut, so these edges carry flow equal to their respective capacities. This establishes (ii) of the lemma. Parts (i) and (iii) follow from Lemma 1.
The inequalities (2) express that the supply from S + is short with respect to the demanders in D − , whereas the demand in D + is short with respect to the supply in S − .
Example 4: Several possible decompositions
In general, the decomposition is not unique as there are several minimum cuts, all with identical capacities. If there is a unique min-cut, as for instance in Figure 3 , the decomposition of the market in two segments is unique too (this holds true for an open and dense set of vectors (s, d)). If it is not unique, there is a partition S + , S − (resp. D + , D − ) where S − (resp. D − ) is the largest possible, and one where it is smallest. In Figure 4 , there are two ways to decompose the demand and the supply sides. One possible decomposition is D − = {1, 2},
In contrast, a familiar graph-theoretical result, the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition (see [18] , and [5] , [4] , or [?] for applications), determines a unique partition of the market but in up to three segments. In one segment supply is overdemanded and the corresponding demanders must be rationed; in the second segment supply is underdemanded, and these suppliers transfer less than their ideal share; and in the third segment supply exactly balances demand. In Figure 4 the three segments of this decomposition are depicted as (S + , D − ), (S − , D + ) and (S 0 , D 0 ) respectively.
Pareto optimality
We now have a bipartite graph G between S and D as before, but we replace the hard capacity constraint of the previous section by a soft ideal consumption. Each supplier i has single-peaked preferences 4 R i (with corresponding indifference relation I i ) over her net transfer x i , with peak s i , and each demander j has single-peaked preferences R j (I j ) over her net transfer y j , with peak d j . We write R for the set of single peaked preferences over R + , and R S∪D for the set of preference profiles.
The feasible net transfer (x, y) ∈ A(G) is Pareto optimal if for any other (x , y ) ∈ A(G) we have {for all i, j: x i R i x i and y j R j y j } ⇒ {for all i, j: x i I i x i and y j I j y j } We write PO(G, R) for the set of Pareto optimal net transfers. 
ii) (x, y) ∈ PO(G, R) if and only if (x, y) ∈ A(G) and
An important feature of the Pareto set is that it only depends upon the profile of peaks s, d, and not upon the full preference profile R. The same is true of our egalitarian solution. To emphasize this important simplification, we speak of a transfer problem (S, D, G, s, d) or simply (G, s, d), keeping in mind the underlying single-peaked preferences.
The following subset of PO(G, R) will play an important role:
By Proposition 1, this is the set of efficient allocations where the short side gets its optimal transfer:
Moreover by Lemma 2, the net transfers in PO * (G, s, d) are precisely those implemented by all the maximal flows of the capacity graph Γ(G, s, d).
We focus on allocations in PO * (G, s, d), because under the Voluntary Trade (requiring x i R i 0, y j R j 0 for all i, j; see Section 8) property, they are the only allocations Pareto optimal for any choice of preferences in R with peaks (s, d).
The egalitarian transfer solution
We give two definitions of our egalitarian solution. The first one is a constructive algorithm. The second one is based on the fact that, within the subset PO * of Pareto optimal allocations, this allocation equalizes individual shares in the strong sense of Lorenz dominance (defined below).
We fix a problem (G, s, d) such that s i , d j > 0 for all i, j (clearly if s i = 0 or d j = 0 we can ignore supplier i or demander j altogether). We define independently our solution for the suppliers and for the demanders.
The definition for suppliers is by induction on the number of agents |S|+|D|. Consider the parameterized capacity graph Γ(λ), λ ≥ 0: the only difference between this graph and Γ(G, s, d) is that the capacity of the edge σi, i ∈ S − is min{λ, s i }, which we denote λ ∧ s i . (In particular, the edge from j to τ still has capacity d j ). We set α(λ) to be the maximal flow in Γ(λ). Clearly α is a piecewise linear, weakly increasing, strictly increasing at 0, and concave function of λ, reaching its maximum when the total σ-τ flow is d D+ . Moreover, each breakpoint is one of the s i (type 1), and/or is associated with a subset of suppliers X such that
Then we say it is of type 2. In the former case the associated supplier reaches his peak and so cannot send any more flow. In the latter case the group of suppliers in X is a bottleneck, in the sense that they are sending enough flow to satisfy the collective demand of the demanders in f (X) and these are the only demanders they are connected to; any further increase in flow from any supplier in X would cause some demander in f (X) to accept more than his peak demand.
If the given problem does not have any type-2 breakpoint, then the egalitarian solution obtains by setting each supplier's allocation to his peak value. Otherwise, let λ * be the first type-2 breakpoint of the max-flow function; by the max-flow min-cut theorem, for every subset X satisfying (4) at λ * the cut C 1 = {σ}∪X ∪f (X) is a minimal cut in Γ(λ * ) providing a certificate of optimality for the maximum-flow in Γ(λ * ). If there are several such cuts, we pick the one with the largest X * (its existence is guaranteed by the usual supermodularity argument). The egalitarian solution obtains by setting
and assigning to other agents their egalitarian share in the reduced problem
) the capacity of the edge σi to λ∧s i , and look for the first type-2 breakpoint λ * * of the corresponding max-flow function. An important fact is that λ * * > λ * . Indeed there exists a subset X * * of S X * such that
If λ * * ≤ λ * we can combine this with equation (4) at X * as follows
contradicting our choice of X * as the largest subset of S − satisfying (4) at λ * . The solution thus obtained recursively is the egalitarian allocation for the suppliers. A similar construction works for demanders: We consider the parameterized capacity graph ∆(µ), µ ≥ 0, with the capacity of the edge τ j, j ∈ D set to µ ∧ d j . We look for the first type-2 breakpoint µ * of the maximal flow β(µ) of ∆(µ), and for the largest subset of demanders Y such that
etc.. Combining these two egalitarian allocations yields the egalitarian allocation (x e , y e ) ∈ R S∪D + for the overall problem.
We now illustrate the algorithm by revisiting the examples of Section 2.
Example 5: Example 1 revisited
In Example 1 the egalitarian allocation is (x , y ) = ( (6, 6, 4, 8) , (6, 9, 9) ). In Example 3 we saw that there is a unique min cut given by C 1 = {σ} ∪ {X} ∪ {f (X)} where X = {supplier 1}. Agents in the minimum cut form the partition (S − , D + ) whereas S + = {suppliers 2,3,4} and D − = {demanders 2,3}. We start with (S − , D + ). The algorithm looks for λ 1 such that min{s 1 , λ 1 } = 6, giving λ 1 = 6. For the other segment, the descending algorithm stops at λ 2 = 9. Indeed min{d 2 , λ 2 } + min{d 3 , λ 2 } = s 2 + s 3 + s 4 .
Example 6: Example 2 revisited
Recall that there is a single segment in which the demand is long. The algorithm first stops at λ 1 = 10. Indeed min{d 1 , λ 1 } = s 1 . The algorithm next stops at λ 2 = 8 since min{d 2 , λ 2 } = s 2 . Finally, the algorithm stops at λ 3 = 5 since min{d 3 , λ 3 } + min{d 4 , λ 3 } = s 3 + s 4 .
We turn now to the Lorenz dominant position of our solution inside PO * (G, s, d). For any z ∈ R N , write z * for the order statistics of z, obtained by rearranging the coordinates of z in increasing order. For z, w ∈ R N , we say that z Lorenz dominates w, written z LD w, if for all
Lorenz dominance is a partial ordering, so not every set, even convex and compact, admits a Lorenz dominant element. On the other hand, in a convex set A there can be at most one Lorenz dominant element. The appeal of a Lorenz dominant element in A is that it maximizes over A any symmetric and concave collective utility function W (z) (see e.g., [15] ).
Proof: In the Appendix.
We note that our solution is not Lorenz dominant in the entire Pareto set. Example 7: Example 1 continued The egalitarian allocation is (x e , y e ) = ( (6, 6, 4, 8) , (6, 9, 9) ). The allocation (x , y ) = ( (10, 6, 4, 8) , (10, 9, 9) ), where supplier 1 improves to his peak at the expense of demander 1, is also Pareto optimal by Proposition 1. It Lorenz dominates (x e , y e ).
Properties of the egalitarian transfer rule
We introduce the incentives and equity properties which form the basis of our characterization result in the next section. Those properties bear on the profile of individual preferences R, therefore instead of a transfer problem (G, s, d), we consider now a transfer economy (G, R). We use the notation s[
for the peak transfer of supplier i and demander j.
Definition: Given the agents (S, D), a rule ψ selects for every economy
We define first five incentives and monotonicity properties for an abstract rule ψ, then two equity properties. Link monotonicity requires that an agent on either side of the market weakly benefits from the access to new links. As discussed in the introduction, this ensures that no agent has an incentive to close a feasible link; equivalently it is a dominant strategy to reveal all feasible links to the manager. 
Proposition 2: The egalitarian transfer rule is link-monotonic. Proof We fix a supplier i ∈ S and show that her allocation x i increases weakly from the addition of link ij to G. In the algorithm defining the egalitarian solution for suppliers, we denote by λ k , k = 1, 2, · · · , the k-th type-2 breakpoints of the max-flow function with corresponding bottleneck sets X k : so λ k is the first type-2 break-point of the maxflow over the graph
(with the convention λ 0 = 0). Compare the algorithms defining our solution at G and G = G ∪ {ij}, assuming that i is of order k. Clearly the first k − 1 steps of the algorithm are unchanged at G , in particular λ t = λ t for t = 1, · · · , k − 1. Moreover λ k ≤ λ k because the right-hand term in (4) increases weakly while the left-hand term stays put. Distinguish two cases. If s i ≤ λ k then i is still of order k at G , so
Note that the addition of a link ij may well hurt agents other than i, j. In Figure 5 , we show an example with short demand in which our rule picks the allocation x 1 = 3 and x 2 = 1. Adding the link between supplier 2 and demander 1 gives
In the rest of the section we discuss properties for which the graph G is fixed, so we write a rule simply as ψ(R) for R ∈ R S∪D . The next incentive property is the familiar strategyproofness. It is useful to decompose it into a monotonicity and an invariance condition. Peak Monotonicity: An agent's net transfer is weakly increasing in her reported peak: for all R ∈ R S∪D , i ∈ S, j ∈ D and
and similarly
Each one of Peak Monotonicity or Invariance implies own-peak-only: my net transfer only depends upon the peak of my preferences, and not on the way I compare allocations across my peak.
The next Lemma connects these three properties and Pareto optimality. Lemma 3 i) If a rule is peak monotonic and invariant, it is strategyproof; ii) An efficient and strategyproof rule is peak monotonic and invariant. Proof: We omit the easy argument proving statement i), just as in the Sprumont model. Statement ii) We prove (peak) monotonicity for a given supplier i (and omit the entirely similar argument for a demander). Fix a Pareto optimal and strategyproof rule ψ, a preference profile R ∈ R S∪D , a supplier i ∈ S, and an alternative preference R i ∈ R. Notation:
) are the profiles of peaks at R and R respectively; finally
We Assume next
We show invariance next, again in the case of a supplier i, and with the same notation. Under the premises of property (5) inside the left bracket, if x i > x i we have s i ≤ x i < x i , hence a violation of SP for agent i at R . If x i < x i we can find a preference R * i with peak s * i = s i such that x i P * i x i . By own-peak-only (a consequence of Monotonicity) ψ i (R * i , R −i ) = x i , so agent i with preferences
Proposition 3
The egalitarian transfer rule is peak monotonic and invariant, hence strategyproof as well. Proof Because the egalitarian transfer rule is peak-only, it is enough to speak of the profiles of peaks, instead of the full fledged preferences.
Peak Monotonicity. We fix a benchmark profile (s,
Let the decomposition at (s, d) be S −,+ and D −,+ , the decomposition at (s , d) be S −,+ and D −,+ .
Assume that at (s, d), i ∈ S − and x i is of order k. Hence at (s , d), i ∈ S − as well. Clearly the first k − 1 steps of the algorithm are unchanged at (s , d), in particular λ t = λ t for t = 1, · · · , k − 1. Moreover λ k ≥ λ k because the left-hand term in (4) increases weakly while the right hand stays put. However λ k ≥ s i is guaranteed because up to λ = s i , equation (4) is the same at (s, d) and at (s , d). Distinguish two cases. If
Now assume that at (s, d), i ∈ S + . Then the egalitarian transfer rule gives
Observe that at (s , d) all demanders in f (T ) ∩ D − receive transfers only from T , because G(S − , f (T ) ∩ D − ) = ∅, moreover they are in D + (again by (2) ). This shows
By Pareto optimality for all k ∈ T such that k = i, x k ≤ s k which together with 6 and 7 implies x i ≥ s i = x i .
As usual we omit the entirely similar argument for a change of peak by a demander j.
Invariance. In the premises of (5), the case s[R i ] < ψ i (R) never happens with the egalitarian solution. Now we fix as above i ∈ S, and two profiles of peaks (s, d) and (s , d) that only differ in the i-coordinate. As in the premises of (5), we also assume s i > x i , s i ≥ x i . Hence i ∈ S − necessarily, implying i ∈ S − as well.
Assume that at (s, d), x i is of order k. Again the first k − 1 steps are unchanged at (s , d). Now s i > x i implies λ k < s i and i ∈ X k . Therefore the algorithm at (s , d) proceeds exactly as at (s, d) and x = x (for all suppliers).
Our next property resembles the type of cross-monotonicity property which appeared first in Shapley and Shubik' bilateral assignment games ([22] ). Cross Monotonicity: Increasing the peak of a supplier (resp. demander) weakly benefits agents on the other side and weakly hurts those on the same side: for all R ∈ R S∪D , j * ∈ D, and R j * ∈ R we have
And a similar statement where we exchange the role of demanders and suppliers. Proposition 4: The egalitarian transfer rule is cross monotonic. Proof in the Appendix.
We now turn to equity properties. The familiar equity test of no envy must be adapted to our model because of the feasibility constraints. If supplier 1 envies the net transfer x 2 of supplier 2, it might not be possible anyway to give him x 2 because the demanders connected to agent 1 have insufficient demands. Even if we can exchange the net transfers of 1 and 2, this may require to construct a new flow and alter some of the other agents' allocations. In either case we submit that supplier 1 has no legitimate claim against the allocation x. An envy argument by agent 1 against agent 2 is legitimate only if it is feasible to improve upon agent 1's allocation without altering the allocation of anyone other than agent 2. No Envy: For any preference profile R ∈ R S∪D and any i 1 , i 2 ∈ S such that ψ i2 (R)P i1 ψ i1 (R), there exists no (x, y) ∈ A(G) such that
and a similar statement where we exchange the role of demanders and suppliers. Note that if i 1 , i 2 have identical connections, i 1 j ∈ G ⇔ i 2 j ∈ G, then we can exchange their allocations without altering any other net transfer, therefore No Envy implies ψ i1 (R)I i1 ψ i2 (R).
The familiar horizontal equity property must be similarly adapted to account for the bilateral constraints on transfers. Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE): For any preference profile R ∈ R S∪D and any i 1 , i 2 ∈ S such that R i1 = R i2 , there exists no (x, y) ∈ A(G) such that
and a similar statement where we exchange the role of demanders and suppliers.
Again, if i 1 , i 2 have identical connections ETE implies ψ i1 (R) = ψ i2 (R). In general ETE requires the rule to equalize as much as possible the allocations of two agents with identical preferences.
Proposition 5 i) No Envy plus Pareto optimality imply Equal Treatment of Equals;
ii) The egalitarian transfer rule ψ e satisfies No Envy.
Proof: Statement i). Suppose the rule ψ violates ETE and check it violates No
Envy and/or Pareto optimality. Fix a profile R ∈ R S∪D and two suppliers 1, 2 such that
* , and there exists (x, y) satisfying (9) . Note that x 1 + x 2 = ψ 1 (R) + ψ 2 (R) because x and ψ(R) coincide on S ∪ D {1, 2}, and by conservation of flows. Assume without loss ψ 1 (R) < ψ 2 (R): then only two cases are possible:
Assume the first case. If s * ≥ ψ 2 (R), supplier 1 envies 2 via (x, y); similarly s * ≤ ψ 1 (R) implies a violation of No Envy. If x 1 ≤ s * ≤ x 2 , the profile of transfers (x, y) is Pareto superior to ψ(R) (for both agents). If x 2 < s * < ψ 2 (R), the profile (x , y), x 2 = s * , x 1 = x 1 + x 2 − s * , x k = x k else, is a convex combination of (x, y) and ψ(R), so it is feasible (A(G) is convex), and Pareto superior to ψ(R) (for both agents). The case ψ 1 (R) < s * < x 1 leads to a similar violation of PO. In the second case, observe that the profile (x , y),
otherwise, is a convex combination of (x, y) and ψ(R), so it is feasible and we are back to the first case. Statement ii). Let R be a profile at which supplier 1 envies supplier 2 via (x, y). We have ψ 
Characterization result
Our last incentive property. It states that each agent is entitled to keep her endowment of the commodity and refuse to trade. It is weaker than Link Monotonicity.
Voluntary trade: For all R ∈ R S∪D , i ∈ S ∪ D, we have ψ i (R)R i 0.
Theorem 2:
The egalitarian transfer rule ψ e is characterized by Pareto optimality, Strategyproofness, Voluntary Trade, and Equal Treatment of Equals.
Proof in the Appendix.
Concluding comments
Summary: Our model generalizes the two-sided version of the fair division model with single-peaked preferences ( [11] ), by adding bipartite feasibility constraints. The market is divided in two independent submarkets, one with excess supply and one with excess demand. The relevant Pareto optimal allocations are described in each submarket as the core of a submodular game. Our solution is the Lorenz dominant such allocation, corresponding to Dutta and Ray's egalitarian solution ( [9] ) in each one of these cooperative games.
The corresponding rule is characterized by the combination of efficiency, strategyproofness and a version of equal treatment of equals where equalizing transfers are restricted to those that do not affect the shares of agents not involved in the transfer.
We conjecture that the egalitarian transfer rule is also group-strategyproof, i.e., robust against coordinated misreport of preferences by subgroups of agents.
Extensions: First, following Sasaki ([20] ) and Ehlers and Klaus ([10] ) for the division model under single peaked preferences, we can think of a "discrete" variant where indivisible units have to be traded between sellers and demanders. Both papers above offer a characterization of the randomized uniform rule, and it is likely that their result can be adapted to our model with bilateral constraints. Second, we have considered here only rules which treat agents with identical preferences as equally as possible given the bilateral constraints. Dropping the strong assumption of Equal Treatment of Equals, we would like to understand what rules meet the other three properties in Theorem 2. That question is already difficult in the standard rationing model ( [3] , [16] ).
[22] Shapley, L., and Shubik, M., (1972) "The assignment game 1: the core,"
International Journal of Game Theory, 1, 111-130.
[23] Sönmez, T. andÜnver, U., Observe that green suppliers prefer to send more flow, red suppliers prefer to send less; whereas green demanders prefer to receive less flow, and red demanders prefer to receive more. Consider the following directed graph G ϕ associated with the given flow ϕ: orient all edges of G from the supplier to the demander; moreover, if ϕ ij > 0, introduce a directed edge from the demander node j back to supplier node i. These new edges are called "backward" edges. This graph is called the residual network with respect to ϕ. It captures all possible ways in which the current flow can be modified.
Because (x, y) is Pareto optimal, there is no path from a green node to a red node in G ϕ . Indeed if there is such a path, we can increase flow along that path (keeping in mind that whenever we use backward edges we are actually reducing flow on that edge in the original network, as would be the case on the first edge of a path from a green demander to a red supplier), so the flow ϕ is clearly not Pareto optimal. Define X to be the set of all green nodes and all the nodes that one can reach from any green node in the residual network G ϕ ; let Y be the set of all red nodes and all the nodes from which one can reach a red node in G ϕ . Notice that X and Y are disjoint: if they had any member in common then we would find a path from a green node to a red node in G ϕ . Thus every node in X is green or black; every node in Y is red or black. Let Z be the set of the remaining nodes, so that X, Y , and Z partition the nodes of G; clearly every node in Z is black.
Step 
By (2) and the fact that the only nodes in S − that a node in Z + ∪Y + is connected to are in Z − ∪ Y − :
Thus we conclude that the inequalities above are all equalities. In particular, the nodes in Z + cannot receive any flow from any supplier in S + .
Step 2. If (x, y) is Pareto optimal, we have x ≥ s on S + and y ≤ d on D − . We omit the entirely similar proof. Like in the proof of Step 1, the proof here also yields the additional conclusion that the suppliers in S + ∩ (X ∪ Z) cannot send any flow to D + .
Step 3. If (x, y) is Pareto optimal, then ϕ is null between S − and D − , or between S + and D + . The first statement follows from Lemma 2 (statement i)). To prove the second, suppose ϕ ij > 0 for some i ∈ S + and j ∈ D + . From the proofs of steps 1 and 2, we know that i must be in Y and j must be in X. By the definition of X and Y , G ϕ must contain a path from a green node to j and a path from i to a red node; this along with arc (j, i) in the residual network implies the existence of a path from a green node to a red node in G ϕ , a contradiction.
Theorem 1
We first give an alternative characterization of the Pareto * set, critical to the analysis of the egalitarian solution. Define two cooperative games, (S, v) and (D, w), of which the players are respectively the suppliers and the demanders:
w(E) = min
Lemma 4
The games (S, v) and (D, w) are submodular. Moreover
Proof A set function h(·) is submodular if for all sets X and X
It is modular or additive if the inequality above is satisfied as an equality (for all sets X and X ). Given a modular function l(·) and a submodular function
We omit the straightforward argument showing that k(·) is submodular as well. This implies that v and w are submodular, because T → s T and E → d E are modular, while T → d f (T ) and E → s g(E) are submodular. We check equations (12) . For each S ⊆ S, the set {σ} ∪ S S ∪ f (S S ) is a cut of Γ(G, s, d) with capacity s S + d f (S S ) , and any other cut has infinite capacity. Therefore v(S) is a min-cut of Γ(G, s, d), hence Lemma 2 gives v(S) = s S+ + d D+ . Next v(S − ) = d D+ easily follow from the fact that the transfer d is feasible in G(S − , D + ) under the capacity constraint s. Similar arguments give the rest of (12) .
The core of the game (S, v), denoted Core(S, v), is the set of allocations x ∈ R S + such that x T ≤ v(T ) for all T ⊂ S, and x S = v(S); similarly the core of the game (D, w) is the set of allocations y ∈ R D + such that y E ≤ w(E) for all E ⊂ D, and Proof of Theorem 1. For z, w ∈ R N , we say that z lexicographically dominates w if the first coordinate a in which z * and w * are not equal is such that z * a > w * a . We show that the egalitarian solution lexicographically dominates any other solution. Recall that in an arbitrary submodular cooperative game, the egalitarian core selection introduced in [9] Lorenz dominates every other core allocation. As the set PO * (G, s, d) is the intersection of the cores of two submodular games (Lemma 5), it has a unique Lorenz dominant element, which must also be lexicographically optimal . As the lexicographically optimal element is always unique, it must also be Lorenz dominant.
We prove the result for the suppliers by induction on the number of agents. An analogous argument for the demanders, omitted as usual, completes the proof. The result is clearly true when there is a single supplier, and when the max-flow function (defined earlier) α(λ) does not have any type-2 breakpoints. In the latter case, every supplier will be allocated his peak, which clearly Lorenz dominates every other allocation. Let λ * be the first type-2 breakpoint of the max-flow function α(λ), and let X * be the corresponding largest bottleneck set of suppliers (4) . The following facts about the egalitarian allocation are clear:
• Each supplier i ∈ X * will send s i or λ * , whichever is smaller.
• Each supplier i ∈ X * with s i ≤ λ * will send s i .
• Each supplier i ∈ X * with s i > λ * will send a flow that is strictly above λ * .
(the last statement because λ * * > λ * ). Therefore all the suppliers with a peak at or below λ * transfer their peak values; every other supplier sends at least λ * and those in X * send exactly λ * . Let W be the set of suppliers (both in X * and outside) with peak at or below λ * . Clearly, the allocations of the suppliers in W cannot be improved. It is also clear that in any other allocation at least one of the suppliers in X * \ W who is not sending his peak must send at most λ * . This is because, in the egalitarian allocation, they split equally the d f (X * ) − s X * ∩W units of flow they collectively send. In any other allocation, they send at most these many units of flow, so the smallest allocation of a supplier in X * \ W is at most λ * . And if this smallest allocation is exactly λ * , the allocation coincides with the egalitarian allocation on X * ∪ W . Thus the egalitarian allocation lex-dominates any allocation that does not agree with it on the allocations of the suppliers in W ∪ X * . We can therefore fix the allocations of the suppliers in W ∪ X * to their egalitarian allocation for the purposes of proving lex-dominance. Let W be the subset of Pareto optimal allocations that gives each supplier in W ∪ X * their egalitarian allocation. Note that in every allocation in W, each demander j ∈ f (X * ) receives his peak demand, all of which flows from the suppliers in X * . Thus, none of these demanders receives additional flow from the suppliers in S \X * in any allocation in W. By construction, no supplier in X * has links to a demander in D \ f (X * ). Thus proving lex-dominance of the egalitarian allocation for the original problem is equivalent to proving the following statement: when restricted to the suppliers in S \X * , the egalitarian allocation lexicographically dominates all the allocations in W. The restriction of the egalitarian allocation to the suppliers in S \ X * is identical to the egalitarian allocation of the subproblem (S \ X * , D \ f (X * )). This, however, is a smaller problem, so, by the induction hypothesis, the egalitarian allocation of this subproblem lexicographically dominates any other Pareto optimal allocation, and, in particular, those in W.
The above proof implies the following Corollary 1 For any problem (G, s, d), the allocation x e (resp. y e ) is the egalitarian selection in Core(S, v) (resp. Core(D, w)).
Proposition 4
Step 1: a demander's peak increases ⇒ all suppliers shares increase weakly
We want to show that all suppliers are weakly better off. Let the successive bottlenecks for the suppliers' algorithm be
and λ l at d; the corresponding shares are x i = λ k ∧ s i and
e., they give us one of the decompositions). Finally we write λ ∧ s T = i∈T min{λ, s i }.
We need to show x i ≤ x i for i ∈ Y L (there is nothing to prove for i ∈ S + ). Note that with the convention X K+1 = S + (i.e., S S − ), and
We prove by induction on l, 1 ≤ l ≤ L the statement P l :
where k is defined by (13) . Note that P l implies
we have x i = s i ≥ x i by Pareto optimality. Thus all we need to prove is P l .
Check P 1 . By definition of X k , λ k , we have
and by definition of X k+1 , λ k+1 (including the case k = K)
Next the definition of X 1 , λ 1 gives
Finally we check the inequality
If some demander j whose demand increased is in f ( X 1 ∩ Y k ), she is in f ( X 1 ) as well, so (17) follows from the corresponding inequality with d instead of d. Combining the latter with (14) , (15) , and (16) gives
from which P 1 follows at once. Assume P 1 , · · · , P l and check P l+1 . Let k 0 be the largest k associated by (13) with some l , 1 ≤ l ≤ l, and let l 0 be the smallest l achieving k 0 . By assumption λ k0 < λ l0 < λ l+1 . We distinguish three cases.
In Case 1 the integer k associated with l + 1 by (13) is strictly smaller than k 0 so λ k+1 ≤ λ k0 < λ l < λ l+1 , and we are done. In Case 2 the integer defined by (13) for l + 1 is k 0 ; we already have λ k0 < λ l0 < λ l+1 so we only need to prove the second part of P l .
By definition of X k0+1 , λ k0+1 we have
where we use the notation X l0,··· ,l+1 = ∪ l+1 t=l0 X t .
Next the definitions of
Indeed any demander whose demand goes up appearing in the d term on the right is also present in the left term, so we can replace d by d. Then the two sets f (
. Combining the four inequalities and one equality above gives
and we are done. In Case 3 we have Y l ⊆ Y k , and we proceed as in the proof of P 1 , with the following arguments
then the inequality
follows from the usual argument to replace d by d, and the inclusion
showing that the two disjoint sets on the left are included in the set on the right. Combining these inequalities and equality, we now have
and the proof is complete.
The last inequality is because
by definition of l 0 , thus both subsets are contained in f (X k0,··· ,k+1 ) f (Y k0−1 ). Combining the three inequalities gives
k+1 ≥ s i as desired. The proof of Q k+1 in Case 3 is entirely similar to that of Q 1 . We omit it for brevity.
Theorem 2
The egalitarian transfer rule selects by construction ψ e (R) in PO * (G, s, d) for all R with peaks (s, d), thus ψ Recall from Lemma 4 and the comments immediately before that ψ is own-peak-only, in particular ψ i (R) = ψ i (R i , R −i ). Now 0P i ψ i (R i , R −i ) contradicts voluntary trade. As usual we omit the similar proof of the other statement.
Step 2 It remains to prove that for all R with peaks (s, d), and any corresponding partitions S +,− , D +,− , the projections of ψ(R) on S − and D − coincide with that of ψ e . We focus on S − , omitting the similar argument for D − . By statement ii) of Lemma 5, the projection of ψ(R) on S is in Core(S − , v), and this inclusion can be written as the following system:
x ≤ s on S − and x T ≤ d f (T ) for all T ⊂ S − (19)
Step 2.1 In this step we assume that in the profile R, all suppliers have identical preferences: R i = R i for all i, i ∈ S (there are no constraints on the preferences of demanders). We use ETE to show that x is precisely the Lorenz dominant allocation x among those satisfying system (19) , (20) . Claim 1. Pick an agent 1 in S − such that x 1 = x * p (so x 1 = max S− x i ). Then,
As x is Lorenz dominant we have x * p ≥ x * p . If x i = x * p for all i ∈ S − , then x = x (because x S− = x S− ) and we are done. Suppose next there is at least one i ∈ S − such that x i < x * p . We show that if x i < s i , there exists a coalition S(i) ⊂ S − containing i but not 1, such that x S(i) = d f (S(i)) . Suppose, on the contrary, x T < d f (T ) for all T ⊂ S − containing i but not 1. A Pigou Dalton transfer from x 1 to x i transforms x into x such that x 1 = x 1 − ε, x i = x i + ε, x j = x j elsewhere. If ε is small enough, x satisfies (19), (20) , in contradiction of ETE.
We set S * = ∪ i:xi<x * p ,si S(i). By submodularity of T → d f (T ) we have x S * = d f (S * ) . By construction for all i ∈ N S * , x i is x * p or s i , hence x i ≥ x i ; moreover N S * contains 1. On the other hand we have
Combining this with x i ≥ x i on N S * gives (21).
Claim 2 Pick agent 2 in S − , 2 = 1, such that x 2 = x * (p−1) . Then
As . If x i = x * (p−1) for all i ∈ S − {1}, then x = x and we are done. Suppose now there is at least one i ∈ S − {1} such that x i < x * (p−1) . If x i < s i there exists a coalition S(i) ⊂ S − containing i but not 2, such that x S(i) = d f (S(i)) , otherwise we can construct as above a Pigou-Dalton transfer from 2 to i. Set S * = ∪ i:xi<x * (p−1) ,si S(i), then x S * = d f (S * ) by submodularity of
. Moreover for all i in N (S * ∪ {1}), x i is x * (p−1) or s i , in particular x i ≥ x i . Combining this with x 1 = x 1 , and x N S * ≥ x N S * ((22)), we see that x and x coincide in N S * , that contains 2. Property (23) follows. The inductive argument establishing x = x is now clear.
Step 2.2 We just proved that ψ and ψ e coincide on S when all suppliers have the same preferences. We use another induction argument, introduced in [6] , to establish this equality for an arbitrary profile R. We use the following notation: for R, R ∈ R S∪D and T ⊂ S, (R [T ] , R [(S T )∪D] ) is the profile equal to R in T and to R elsewhere. Fix a profile R where all suppliers have identical preferences, an integer n, 0 ≤ n ≤ |S| − 1, and consider the following subset of preference profiles R ∈ B( R, n) Then the proof proceeds exactly as in step 2.1. We omit the details.
We have proved that H + (|S| − 1) for any choice of R. Now consider an arbitrary profile R and choose i in S and such that s[R i ] ≥ s[R i ] for all i ∈ S. Choosing for R the profile of preferences R i = R i for all i ∈ S, R j = R j for all j ∈ D, we have R ∈ B( R, |S| − 1) and the proof is complete.
